Suchergebnisse

Cover -- Half Title -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- List of Tables and Figures -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- 1 Policy Research in the Face of Complexity -- 2 Actor-Centered Institutionalism -- 3 Actors -- 4 Actor Constellations -- 5 Unilateral Action in Anarchic Fields and Minimal Institutions -- 6 Negotiated Agreements -- 7 Decisions by Majority Vote -- 8 Hierarchical Direction -- 9 Varieties of the Negotiating State -- Appendix 1: A Game-Theoretical Interpretation of Inflation and Unemployment in Western Europe -- Appendix 2: Efficient Self-Coordination in Policy Networks—A Simulation Study, with Matthias Mohr -- References -- About the Book and Author -- Index

European integration has come to constrain the capacity for democratic political action in EU member states through the judicial constitutionalization of "economic liberties," whereas the capacity for effective political action at the European level is narrowly constrained by the multiple-veto character of the Union's "ordinary legislative procedure." Since both of these constraints have institutional causes, they might be loosened by institutional reforms that shift the competence for negative integration from the sphere of judicial legislation to European political legislation and would allow legislation by majority rule at the European level. In order to ensure democratic legitimacy, however, majoritarian legislation would have to allow national opt-outs.

This essay re-examines the dual – republican and liberal – foundations of democratic legitimacy in the Western traditions of normative political theory. Considered in isolation, the European Union conforms to liberal standards but cannot satisfy republican criteria. Given these conflicting standards, debates on the alleged European democratic deficit have remained inconclusive. Moreover, they have failed to pay sufficient attention to the multilevel character of the European polity and to the normative potential of legitimacy intermediation in its two-step compliance and legitimating relationships. I argue, however, that the capacity of democratic member states to legitimate the exercise of European governing functions is being destroyed in the present euro crisis, and I briefly discuss the implications of this new constellation.

Judge-made law has played a crucial role in the process of European integration. In the vertical dimension, it has greatly reduced the range of autonomous policy choices in the member states, and it has helped to expand the reach of European competences. At the same time, however, "Integration through Law" does have a liberalizing and deregulatory impact on the socioeconomic regimes of EU member states. This effect is generally compatible with the status quo in liberal market economies, but it tends to undermine the institutions and policy legacies of Continental and Scandinavian social market economies. Given the high consensus requirements of European legislation, this structural asymmetry cannot be corrected through political action at the European level.

The function of legitimacy is to ensure voluntary compliance with unwelcome exercises of governing authority. Since practically all European law needs to be implemented and enforced by the governments and courts of the member states, the EU does not have to face its citizens directly. It follows that the legitimacy of European governance ought to be conceptualized at two levels. At one level, the legitimacy of member states is decisive for the compliance of individuals and firms, regardless of the ultimate origin - international, European or national - of the rules that demand this compliance. At the other level, the legitimacy of the European "government of governments" is decisive for the voluntary compliance of member states with the obligations imposed on them by the EU. What should be worrying however is the impact which EU governance - especially the rules of negative integration defi ned by politically non-accountable actors - may have on the legitimacy of member states, and ultimately on their capacity to comply.